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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This court holds jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Rules 3 & 4, Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure, which were in effect in December, 1987.

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS

This is an appeal from a motion for Summary Judgment in favor of Respondents by
Judge Dennis Draney, Seventh District Court in and for the County of Duchesne, State of
Utah, on 17th of June 1987. (R. 129-130)

STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL

Was the remedy of Summary Judgment, the statute of limitations supposedly having
passed, appropriate in view of Appellant's contentions below, regarding facts of discovery
of the cause of action?
What is the proper statute of limitations in cases involving negligence?

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES

Utah Code Annotated Title 78, Chapter 12, Section 26(3), as amended.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Appellants are related to one another. In June, 1971, by Uniform Real Estate
Contract, they purchased the parcel of real property comprising thirty (30) acres from
Strawberry River Estates located in Duchesne County, Utah. The parcel had a "T"
configuration with 20 acres being situated West of Red Creek and 10 acres East of Red
Creek. (T 394,431,432) In the fall of 1971, Appellants were contacted by representatives
of Strawberry River Estates because the "T" shaped property sold to Appellants had left
two 5 acre plots on each side of the 10 acre section East of Red Creek which could not be
sold. (T 393) Strawberry River Estates gave Appellants an option to even up the 10 acres

East of Red Creek to 20 acre parcel, or trade the 30 acre parcel they had purchased for other
acreage in a different location. Appellants opted to take the two 5 acre parcels and increase
the total acreage to 40 acres, 20 acres West of Red Creek and 20 acres East cf Red Creek.
IT 395-397) Appellants received a new Uniform Real Estate Contract from Strawberry
River Estates with a description that included the additional 10 acres, which contract was
introduced into evidence as part of Exhibit D -17. IT 398)
Appellants, having reservations regarding the exact location of the boundaries of the
40 acre parcel, decided to have the property surveyed. Appellants contacted and hired the
engineering firm of Wilson & Calder to survey the property. (T 399-400) Appellants, at
the time they made the initial purchase of the 30 acre parcel, requested and received access
through adjoining properties to the 20 acre parcel West of Red Creek. Appellants paid
Strawberry River Estates in full and received a Warranty Deed which included in the
description of the 40 acre parcel the access road to the 20 acre parcel West of Red Creek. IT
400-403)
The 40 acre parcel of property was surveyed by the Respondent, Wilson & Calder.
Under signature of Glen H. Calder Appellants received a Certificate of Survey dated May
15, 1972, certifying the location of the property, the dimensions of the property and that
there were no encroachments on said property. (Exhibit P-I, see exhibit "A") Appellants
had provided the surveyors with a copy of the Uniform Real Estate Contract they received
from Strawberry River Estates and the description of the 40 acre parcel. The surveyors,
after completion of the survey, took Appellant, Harry Kreis, to the property and pointed
out the corner markers and boundaries of the property. IT 413-414)
Appellants,fromthe time they acquired the property, used it for recreation and
camping, planted grass and trees on both sides of Red Creek, repaired the fence along the
County road and put in fence posts East of Red Creek along the North and South
boundaries established by the Calder survey to the County road. (T 403-407) On or about
July 23,1983, Appellants sold the subject property to the Plaintiffs in this action, Robert
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B. and Karol J. Klinger, by description contained in the Warranty Deed from Strawberry
River Estates, which description was confirmed by the Certificate of Survey they obtained
from Calder. Appellants conveyed the property to Klingers by Warranty Deed and received
in return a Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note in the amount of $32,000.00. The property
was sold to Klingers for the asking price of $800.00 per acre, (T. 330). The Klingers had
made three (3) physical inspections of the property with the aid of a plot map obtained from
the County Recorder's office and the Calder Survey Certificate of 1972 prior to the
conveyance. (T 248-250)
In the early part of 1985, some time in the month of February, the Klingers
discovered there was a problem with the boundaries of the subject property. They contacted
Mr. Kightly, one of the Appellants, at his home and informed him that there apparently was
a mistake with the survey. Mr. Klinger told Mr. Kightly that the Realtor, Mr. Wilkerson,
would call and explain the whole situation. (T 432- 433). Appellant, Kightly, after
discussing the problem with the Realtor, Mr. Wilkerson, took immediate action, attempting
to remedy the situation. Kightly contacted Mr. Conder, who claimed ownership of the 20
acre parcel West of Red Creek wishing to purchase any interest claimed by Mr. Conder,
thereby removing the cloud on the title, created by the boundary discrepancies. Appellants
kept the Klingers informed of their actions and efforts. (T 434-440)
During this period, the Klingers, without knowledge of Appellants, made
arrangements to purchase the interest Mr. Conder claimed in the 20 acres West of Red
Creek. (T. 440) Klingers commenced their action in May, 1986, after they received a
commitment from Conder to purchase out his interest, claiming fraud and misrepresentation
on the part of Appellants. One year later, at a Pre-trial hearing, Klingers abandoned their
fraud claim against Appellants, dismissed the action against the Defendants, United Farm
Agency and Gerald W. Wilkerson, amended their Complaint alleging mutual mistake,
seeking rescission of the Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note.
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After leave of Court, Appellants filed a Third Party Complaint against Wilson &
Calder and Glen E. Calder individually. Calder filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and
after Memoranda were submitted to the Court, the Motion for Summary Judgment was
denied. Respondent, Calder, filed a Motion to Reconsider the Motion for Summary
Judgment and following the filing of Supplemental Memoranda the District Court, by
ruling dated June 17,1987, granted Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment and
dismissed the Third Party Complaint, ruling that the Third Party claim of the Appellants
was barred by statute of limitations, basing its granting of the motion on Utah Code Ann.
$8-12-25(2). (R. 196-197)
The case was tried to the Court June 23, 1987. The Court, by ruling dated June 24,
1987, rescinded Klingers Trust Deed and Note for the purchase of the subject real property
on condition that the Klingersreconvey the real property, free of all encumbrances, and
restore the property to its original condition. (R. 147 ) The trial Court concluded Klingers
were entitled to recover the amount of the purchase price they had paid, taxes and interest
without providing off-set or compensation to Appellants for Respondents use and
occupancy of the portion of the property conveyed (20 acres East of Red Creek) that was
not in dispute. Klingers, from the time they discovered and became aware of the boundary
problem to the time of trial, retained title, possession and control over the 40 acres
conveyed to them by Appellants. Although Klingers obtained a Deed from Conder to the 20
acre parcel West of Red Creek (T 382- 384) they did not tender or convey the 40 acres back
to Appellants (T 302); they stopped making payments to Appellants, primarily due to their
financial problems in that they made no payments to Conder and were in default on their
agricultural loan. (T 302-306) The evidence proffered at Pre-trial, May 22, 1987, and at
trial, was undisputed, establishing the fact that the property sold and conveyed to Klingers
contained 40 acres. The portion of the property in dispute caused by the defective survey,
comprised the 20 acre parcel West of Red Creek only. There was no dispute as to the 20
acre parcel East of Red Creek. Klingers were in agreement with Appellants efforts to
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remedy and correct the defect, (T 435) butfrustratedAppellants efforts and attempts to do
so. (T. 441)
At the Pre-trial Conference held in lieu of the scheduled trial, May 22,1987, the
Court stated that application of equitable principals to this case would result in adjustment
of the total purchase price for the 20 acre parcel West of Red Creek in that there was no
dispute to the land sold and conveyed to Klingers comprising the 20 plus acre parcel East
of Red Creek. The lower Court, after trial, instead of affecting a partial rescission of the
Trust Deed and Note for the purchase of the 40 acres and adjusting the purchase price,
concluded that Klingers were entitled to a full rescission of the Trust Deed and Note
conditioned upon a reconveyance of the 40 acre parcel free and clear of the hen and
encumbrance placed thereon by Klingers, replacement of fence posts that had been
removed and restoring the parcel comprising 20 plus acres East of Red Creek to its original
condition within ninety (90) days of its ruling. (R 146-148) Appellants Motion for New
Trial, to clarify the Judgment and ruling of the Court (R 173-178) was denied by Minute
Entry dated November 1,1987 without hearing. (R 198) The Order denying the Motion for
New Trial was signed and entered on December 3,1987. (R 200) Appellants, by Affidavit
filed with the Court August 24,1987, placed the Trial Court on notice that the Respondents
had failed to comply with the ruling of the Courttimelyin that they had failed to replace the
fence posts, return the course of Red Creek to its original channel and establish the
East/West boundaries of Red Creek on the subject property that existed in July, 1983. (R
189-191) Respondents filed a Counter Affidavit on or about September 3,1987 claiming
compliance with the Court's ruling. (R 192-194) Notice of Appeal was timely filed
December 28,1987.
The parties, with the exception of Respondent's Glen H. Calder, John Doe Wilson
and Wilson & Calder, have reached a settlement, and the only issues remaining on appeal
concern the granting below of Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment. By its own
admission, Respondent Calder has stated that this case involves negligence exclusively on
5

the part of Calder (See appendix "A", R. 127), Therefore, argument concerning the proper
staute of limitations to apply is based upon an admission of negligence by Respondent
Calder.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANTS RELIANCE UPON THE "DISCOVERY RULE" BELOW RAISED AN
ISSUE OF FACT THAT COULD NOT PROPERLY BE DISPOSED OF THROUGH SUMMARY
JUDGMENT.

Appellant's cause of action arose when the negligence in respondent's survey was
discovered, in January or February of 1985. (see generally 51 Am. Jur. 2d §121,
Limitations of Actions). The statement concerning the discovery of Respondent's
negligence is an allegation of fact that requires a trial of its merit and veracity. If in fact, the
application of the discovery rule is proper under the facts alleged, then the cause of action
against respondents did not exist prior to its discovery, and the statute of limitations did not
begin to run until the date of the discovery of the cause of action. If, to the contrary, a trial
proved that the discovery rule did not apply to the facts as alleged, then a remedy of
summary judgment would be appropriate, since the factual issues regarding the statute of
limitations and the discovery of the cause of action would have been properly disposed of.
To grant summary judgment when the trier of fact has not actually tried issues of material
fact is improper, and appeal is taken from this premature granting of Respondent's motion.
The burden of presenting competent evidence, not law alone, establishing the
propriety of granting a motion for Summary Judgment based upon an argument of a stale
claim, rests exclusively upon the movant, in this case Respondent Calder. (Staker v.
Huntington Cleaveland Irr. Co.. 664 P. 2d 1188) The burden of Plaintiff s to produce
evidence in regard to a motion for summary judgement rises only to the level of evidence
put on by the movant. (Gadd v. Olson. 685 P. 2d 1041 (Utah 1984)) In order for
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evidence to be used in support of or in opposition to a motion for Summary Judgment, that
evidence must admissible under the rules of evidence. Affidavits, for example, are proper
(Durham v. Margetts. 571 P. 2d 1332 (Utah 1977); Preston v. Lamb. 436 P. 2d 1021
(Utah 1968)) as are depositions, and verified pleadings. (Union Bank v. Pfeffer. 502 P.
2d 535 (Ariz App. 1972).
The court below had received no evidencefromRespondent Calder establishing 1)
that there were no issues of material fact, or 2) that even if all issues of fact had been
resolved in Appellant's favor, Appellant would fail to maintain a cause of action against
Respondent. Respondent's answer was not verified. The only remaining items before the
trier of fact (i.e. had passed the tests supplied by the rules of evidence through a trial as
such) were not evidence at all, but were in the form of memoranda exclusively. There were
no affidavits, no testimony of Calder, no depositions, and the only references to the date of
the survey, its conclusions, and the date of the signing of the certificate were based upon
memoranda alone. In short, there was no evidence whatsoever supporting the granting of
Respondent's motion. It was Respondent's burden to produce evidence and it failed to do
so. Resopndent produce plenty of law, but no facts. The granting of the motion was
therefore improper.
The material issues of fact remaining involved the question of 1) the appropriate
statute of limitations to apply, 2) the applicability of the discovery rule. This Court can
readily conclude that, based upon the memoranda of Appellant and Respondent Calder,
there was considerable confusion concerning the applicable statute of limitations on the part
of not only the parties but also on the part of the court. Without a trial to determine the
facts of the case, or without at least affidavits and depositions, there could be no motion
granted based upon a review of the facts.
Were this court to consider arguments against the application of the discovery rule
meritorious, relief through summary judgment was still inappropriate. In Christiansen v.
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Rees, 436 P. 2d 435 (Utah 1968), the Court addressed the appropriateness of summary
judgment in cases where the discovery rule has been argued applicable:
[T]he question of whether the plaintiff commenced
his action within four years after he knew, or should have
known, (of defendant's alleged negligence) is an issue to be
resolved by the trier of the facts. (Christiansen at 437, italics
added)

Wihout the guidance of fact, the court operated on the basis of pure conjecture in
granting Respondent's motion. This is improper. If the court is operating without the aid
of fact when considering a motion for Summary Judgment, then all doubts whatsoever
must be resolved in favor of Appellant, who acted as the party opposing the motion.
(Controlled Receivables Inc. v. Harman, 413 P. 2d 807 (Utah 1966); (Foster v. Steed. 432
P. 2d 60 (Utah 1967)) In granting the moion without and supportive evidence, the court
below used what has been referred to as a "harsh measure" in such a way that law and
invented facts were strained in favor of the movant, against the cautions of this Court stated
in DeVas v. Noble. 369 P. 2d 290 (Utah 1962); Bowen v. Riverton Citv. 656 P. 2d 434.
The instant case involves a question of whether or not the discovery rule should be
applied, a determination which must be made at trial, and not via memoranda of law alone,
or the invention of fact by the court, following presentation of evidence on point. The
granting of Respondent's motion was therefore improper, as issues of material fact
remained unresolved which required their trial and examination by the trier of fact.
POINT II
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE DISCOVERY RULE TO THE
PRESENT CAUSE BASED UPON NEGLIGENCE PURSUANT TO THE RULINGS OF THIS COURT

The history of the "Discovery Rule" demonstrates that both in legislative and
judicial contexts, both the breadth and frequency of its application has increased. The rule
has been extended to cases in conversion in Becton Dickinson & Co. v. Reese, 668 P. 2d
1254 (Utah 1983), wrongful death in Mevers v. McDonald.635 P. 2d 84 (Utah 1981), and
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medical malpractice in Christiansen v. Rees, 436 P. 2d 435 (Utah 1968), to name but a
few.
The discovery rule is especially applicable to cases, such as the present case, which
are considered "stale" by a strict reading of the statute of limitations but which would result
in no more prejudice to the Defendant through the hardship of having to produce stale
evidence than it would to the Plaintiff who has to produce equally stale evidence, and
where the delay in bringing the action was not the fault of the Plaintiff. Justice Oaks stated
in Mevers, "Defendant cannot establish that he was prejudiced by having to defend a stale
claim since his problems of proof occasioned by the delay are no greater than the
Plaintiffs." (Mevers at 87) Respondents negligently conducted the survey in question thus
causing Appellant's current hardship. The action was brought by Appellants within about a
year of the discovery of Respondent's negligence.
In conjunction with the judicial expansion of the discovery rule, there is a parallel
legislative expansion. See generally: Utah Code Ann. §78-12-19 concerning recovery of
an estate sold by an executor of administrator, Utah Code Ann. §78-12-26(1) for waste or
trespass by underground works on a mining claim; Utah Code Ann. §78-12-26(2) for loss
of branded livestock; Utah Code Ann. §78-12-6(3) for fraud or mistake; Utah Code Ann.
§78-12-27 actions against corporate stockholders or directors; etc. This legislative
application of the discovery rule has not been held to bar its judicial application. In Becton
the Court stated that "Where there are exceptional circumstances that would make
application of the general rule irrational or unjust this Court has adopted the discovery rule
by judicial action." (Becton at 1257, emphasis added) In short, this Court has shown a
clear tendency to broaden the application of the discovery rule both as to the number of
subjects where the rule is proper and in regard to thefrequencywith which it has recendy
been held to apply.
In the instant case, the rule would be properly applied. The negligent behavior of
Respondent, if such is proved at trial, has occasioned great loss, damage and expense in
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terms of the time, energy and financial resources of the parties. Injustice would surely be
worked absent the use of the discovery rule.

CONCLUSION

The granting of Respondent's motion for Summary Judgment below was
prejudicial error. Respondent failed to bear the burden of supporting the motion with
appropriate evidence and fact. Issues of material fact were unresolved below by the court's
improper reliance on memoranda alone, and not the presentation of the facts in the course
of trial, subject to the rules of evidence and the trial of fact. Whether or not Appellant
knew or should have known of Respondent's alleged negligence is a question of material
fact which cannot be disposed of by Summary Judgment.
The discovery rule applies in this case, in accordance with the holdings of this
Court. Respondent, if negligent, is solely responsible for the litigation resultant from the
defective survey in question. If the evidence needed to defend or prove negligence on
Respondent's part is stale, it is stale as per both parties. The memories of both parties have
had over fourteen years to dim, the documents that both need to produce are equally old.
Lastly, injustice would result, since Respondent's negligence, if proved, has produced
loss, damage, costs and expenses to Appellants who properly relied upon Respondent's
expertise and care as a licensed surveyor, in conducting the survey in question. See
Price-Orem investment Company v. Rollins, Brown and GunnelL Inc., 713 P. 2d 55
(Utah 1986) at 59 wherdtherightto rely on representations made by duly licensed party's
expertise and skill was upheld.
Appellant prays that this Court reverse the granting of Respondent's motion below,
to clarify and establish for the court below that at a new trial, Utah Code Ann. 78-12-26(3),
together with the discovery rule, is the law which governs any defense based upon the
running of the statute of limitations. This, together with cost and any other relief the court
determines proper, is Appellant's prayer for relief.
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Respectfully submitted and dated this

day of November, 1988,

Ephraim H. Fankhauser
Attorney for Appellant
MAILING CERTIFICATE

I certify that on this
day of November, 1988,1 mailed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing to Robert R Babcock, Attorney for Respondent, at 185 South State
Suite 1000, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111.
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APPENDIX A

Respondent's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT B. KLINGER and KAROL J.
KLINGER,
Plaintiffs,
UNITED FARM AGENCY, INC.
and GERALD W. WILDERSON,

:
:
:
:
::
:

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

:

Civil No. 86 CV 68D

Defendants.
EUGENE E. KIGHTLY, HELEN L.
RIGHTLY, HARRY D. KREIS,
PEGGY R. KREIS BARNETT,
Third Party Plaintiffs,
vs.
GLEN E. CALDER and JOHN DOE
WILSON, individually and
dba WILSON & CALDER,
Third Party Defendants.

Fact Summary
In June of 1971, Third Party Plaintiffs bought a parcel
of real property in Duchesne County.

Glen Calder, on behalf of

Wilson & Calder, Consulting Engineers and Surveyors, signed a
survey of the subject real property.

0U7u

In July of 1983—eleven years and two months after the
survey was performed—Third Party Plaintiffs sold the same parcel
of real property to Plaintiffs. Neither Plaintiffs nor Third
Party Plaintiffs surveyed the real property in relation to the
1983 sale of the real property.
On May 16, 1986, Third Party Plaintiffs filed the Third
Party Complaint alleging negligence and an improper survey of the
property.

The Third Party Complaint was filed fourteen years

after Calder signed the survey in question.
Authority
Utah Code Ann. Section 78-12-25.5 (1953) controls.

It

provides:
No action to recover damages for any injury to
property, real or personal, or for any injury to the
person, or for bodily injury or wrongful death, arising
out of the defective and unsafe condition of an
improvement to real property, nor any action for
damages sustained on account of such injury, shall be
brought against any person performing or furnishing the
design, planning, supervision of construction or
construction of such improvement to real property more
than seven years after the completion of construction.
. . .

A

recent

Utah

Supreme

Court

case, Hooper

Water

Improvement District v. Reeve, 642 P.2d 745 (Utah 1982), which is
similar to the case before this court in key respects, dealt with
section 78-12-25.5 and reiterated that the seven-year statute of
limitations begins to run on completion of the service.

Hooper

Water, 642 P.2d at 746.
Discussion
The first issue is whether a surveyor comes within the
coverage of the statute.

The language of the controlling statute
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is broad.

It provides that "no action to recover damages for any

injury to property" arising out of a defective condition of an
improvement to real property shall be brought against a person
"performing or furnishing the design, planning . . . ."
In Hooper Water, the Utah Supreme Court applied the
statute to a Consulting Engineer.
Hooper Water had

directed

previous to the complaint.
bars

claims

for

damage

The Consulting Engineer in

the digging

of a well ten years

The Court stated that the :statute
to property

caused

by

any

person

'performing or furnishing the design, planning, supervision of
construction
property.'"
(1953)).

o[r]
Id.

construction

of

improvements

to

real

(quoting Utah Code Ann. Section 78-12-25.5

A surveyor, then, who

also carries the title of

"Consulting Engineer", fits well within the definition of those
covered by the statute.
The second issue is whether the statute of limitations
has run.

This statute is actually a statute of repose, i;n that

it does not begin to run when the cause of action accrues.
Rather, it begins to run when upon completion of the service
performed.

Calder, by Third Party Plaintiff's own admission,

finished the survey May 15, 1972.

See Third Party Complaint, p.

2, and Third Party Plaintiffs' Exhibit A.

Thus, in the present

case, the statute of limitations began to run upon completion of
the survey.

Since the Third Party Complaint was brought May 16,

1986, a fourteen-year period has passed.

This fourteen-year

period far exceeds the seven-year limitation period mandated by
the statute.

0077

Granting this Motion For Summary Judgment would comply
with the purpose for which the Legislature enacted section 78-1225.5.

The Utah Supreme Court explained that the "obvious intent

[of section 78-12-25.5] was to protect

'persons performing or

furnishing the design, planning, supervision of construction or
construction1

of improvements to real property from indefinite

future liability."
concurring).

Hooper Water, 642 P.2d

at 747 (Howe, J.,

The governing policy in this area of law, as

declared by the United States Supreme Court, is that statutes of
limitations

"are designed

to promote justice

by

preventing

surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to
slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and
witnesses have disappeared."

Order of Railroad Telegraphers v.

Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944).
Precedent

from other jurisdictions

also supports a

granting of this Motion for Summary Judgment.
California has a similar statute of limitations.
Code Section 337.15 (West 1982).

For example,
Cal. Civ. Proc.

With the exception that it

provides for a ten-year period, the California statute is almost
identical

to the Utah statute.

specifically includes "surveying."

The California statute also
Over thirty other states have

also enacted similar special statutes of limitations.

See Hooper

Water, 642 P.2d at 747.
Conclusion
A surveyor fits within the scope of section 78-12-25.5.
It is also clear that the seven-year limitation for bringing an
action has lapsed.

We respectfully submit that this Court apply

007b

section 78-12-25.5, follow the lead of the Utah Supreme Court
(which affirmed a dismissal of the action on Motion for Summary
Judgment in Hooper Water) and grant Summary Judgment in favor of
Third Party Defendant.
Respectfully submitted this

day of January, 1987.

WALSTAD & BABCOCK

By ( t k j MdJ<

Robert F. Babcock
Attorneys for Third Party Defendant
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APPENDIX B

Ruling of Judge Draney
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT B. KLINGER and KAROLD
J. KLINGER, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,

'ihOlSTRlCTCOORTDUCHESl

R U L I N G

JUfJ 1 ? 1 S S 7
HOGER K. JViAHtT i, Clerk

vs.

Zy_

EUGENE E. KIGHTLY, HELEN L.
RIGHTLY, et al.,
Defendants.

0>

r:;;

Civil No. 86-CV-68D

The Court, having fully considered the pleadings and the
memoranda, and having now agreed to reconsider Third Party
Defendant's Motion for Summar Judgment hereby enters its ruling.
Based upon the pleadings and memoranda of Third Party
Plaintiffs, the Court finds that the cause of action is one for
negligence.

As such, it must have been commenced within four (4)

years as set forth in Section 78-12-25(2) UCA.

The Court finds

that the last action necessary to complete the cause of action
was Calder's signing of the survey which action occurred in May
of 1972.

This action was not commenced until May 1986. The

Court further rules that the "discovery" requirement of Section
78-12-26(3) does not apply to a cause of action in negligence.
Therefore, the Court's previous ruling is set aside and

Third Party Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted
and the Third Party Complaint is dismissed.
DATED this / 7 ^3ay of June, 1987.
BY THE COURT:

/ ^ J^W»c^ C>^. oL&^^X^'
cc:

iF-

Rick J. Sutherland
E. H. Fankhauser
Robert F. Babcock
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APPENDIX C

Respondent's Second Supplemental Memorandum

Robert F. Babcock (0158)
WALSTAD & BABCOCK
Attorneys for Third
Party Defendant
185 South State, Suite 1000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone (801) 531-7000

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT B. KLINGER and KAROL J.
KLINGER,
Plaintiffs,
SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL
MEMORANDUM

vs.
UNITED FARM AGENCY, INC.
and GERALD W. WILDERSON,
Defendants.

Civil No. 86 CV 68D

EUGENE E. RIGHTLY, HELEN L.
RIGHTLY, HARRY D. RREIS,
PEGGY R. RREIS BARNETT,
Third Party Plaintiffs,
vs.

WGEHr,MWE7(,t w

GLEN E. CALDER and JOHN DOE
WILSON, individually and
dba WILSON & CALDER,
Third Party Defendants.
COMES NOW the Third Party Defendant, Glen E. Calder, by and
through

his

attorney,

and submits

this

Second

Supplemental

the arguments

of its

Supplemental

Memorandum,

incorporating

Memorandum,

in^ support of Third Party Defendant's Motion for

Summary

Judgment

and in response to Third Party Plaintiffs'

Memorandum of Law.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
In June 1971, Third Party Plaintiffs bought a parcel of land
in Duchesne County.

Glen Calder signed a survey of the subject

property in behalf of Wilson & Calder,
In July 1983, eleven years and two months after the survey
was performed, Third Party Plaintiffs sold the subject property
to Plaintiffs.

Neither Plaintiffs nor Third Party Plaintiffs

surveyed the property in relation to the 1983 sale.
Fourteen years after Calder signed the survey in question,
May

16,

1986, Third

Party Plaintiffs

filed

the Third Party

Complaint alleging negligence.
DISCUSSION
I.

Utah's four year statute of limitation, Utah Code Annot. §
78-12-25(2), providing that an action for relief not
otherwise provided for by law is to be brought within four
years, applies to the negligence case at bar.
Third

negligence.

Party

Plaintiffs' cause of

action

See Third Party Complaint,

is grounded

in

pp. 3-4; Third Party

Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law pp. 3, 4, 6, & 7.

That Utah Code

Annot. § 78-12-25(2) is the appropriate section for a negligence
action

such as this is well-settled,

Thomas

v.

Union

Pacific

R.R.Co.,

long-standing Utah law.

1 Utah

235,

236

(1875);

Albretson v. Judd, 709 P.2d 347 (Utah 1985); Matheson v. Pearson,
619 P.2d 321 (Utah 1980); Hansen v. Petrof Trading Co., 527 P.2d
116 (Utah 1974); Peteler v. Robison, 17 P.2d 244 (Utah 1932).
Third

Party

Plaintiffs may not

contort

and align their

negligence cause of action to sound in fraud or mistake to avoid
the applicable statute of limitations.

"Neither the form of the

proceeding nor the name applied to it can change the nature of

01" '

the wrong or the injury . • . the statute fixes the time within
which

such

an

Qualtrough,

action must

be

brought.

156 P. 955, 959 (Utah 1916).

. . . *"

Reese

v.

Interestingly, Third

Party Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law avoids any discussion of Utah
Code Annot. § 78-12-25(2), which was addressed in Third Party
Defendant's Supplemental Memorandum at 3-5.
A cause of action in negligence accrues upon the last event
necessary to complete the cause of action.

Peteler, 17 P.2d at

249; Beckton Dickinson and Co. v. Reese, 668 P.2d
(Utah 1983);

See also Lembert v. Gilbert,

1254, 1257

312 A.2d 335, 337

(Del.Ch. 1973) (statute of limitations commenced to run at time
of surveyor's negligence, not on date plaintiffs became aware of
negligence).

Mere

ignorance of a cause of action does not

prevent the running of the statute of limitations.
McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah 1981).
Third

Party

Defendant

to mislead

There were no efforts by
or

Plaintiffs from filing a timely action.
at any time

Meyers v.

persuade

Third

Party

All facts were available

for Third Party Plaintiffs review.

Even Utah's

medical malpractice statute of limitation which incorporates a
discovery

rule prohibits an action beyond

alleged negligent act.
Third

four years of the

Utah Code Annot. § 78-14-4(1).

Party Plaintiffs, citing 51 Am.Jur.2d

Limitation of

Actions, section 121, state that "the cause of action arose when
the

mistake

was

discovered."

Memorandum of Law at 5.
not mistake.

See

Third

Party

Plaintiffs'

First, this is an action for negligence,

Second, the cited Am.Jur.2d

injury or damage to real property.

section refers to

The Utah legislature has

012'*

designated particular statutes for injury to real property: Utah
Code Annotated §§ 78-12-26

(three year limitation); 78-12-25.5

(seven year limitation)(See Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Co*
v. Conklin Associates, 377 A.2d 740 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1977) wherein the court, applying statutory language equivalent
to the Utah statute, held that surveyors are included in the
statutory language and ruled for a surveyor in a negligent survey
action on the statute of limitations issue).
Pursuant to Third Party Plaintiff's above arguments and
Supplemental Memorandum, Utah Code Annot. 78-12-25(2) applies to
and bars the action currently at bar.

II.

Utah Code Annot. 78-12-26(3) for fraud or mistake is
inapplicable to the negligence action at bar.

Utah Code Annotated § 78-12-26(3) for fraud or mistake is
inapplicable to the case at bar.

Generally mistake statutes are

applied in actions to reform deeds and other written instruments.
54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 92, 198.
this rule.
was

cited

Utah law follows

In those cases where Utah Code Annot. § 78-12-26(3)
for the principle

of mistake, it was

in a fact

situation dealing with the reformation of a deed or other similar
written instrument.

Haslem v. Ottosen, 689 P.2d 27 (Utah 1984);

Dillman v. Foster, 656 P.2d 974 (Utah 1982); Bench v. Pace, 538
P.2d 180 (Utah 1975);

McKellar v McKellar, 458 P.2d 867 (Utah

1969); Doxey v. Layton, 548 P.2d 902 (Utah 1976); McKonkie v.
Hartman, 529 P.2d 801 (Utah 1974).

There was no deed or written

instrument between the parties of this cause of action to reform

through

application

of the mistake

doctrine.

No Utah case

applies the mistake statute of limitations to a negligence action
as the case at bar.
Negligence

is not

"assumes to know."
(Ga. 1946).
inattention

of mistake.

Mistake

Fitzgerald v. Morgan, 38 S.E.2d 171, 173

"It
or

the equivalent

[mistake] is distinguished
absence

of

thought

which

from
are

. . . that
inherent

in

negligence . . . mistake has nothing in common with negligence. .
• •"

Callan Court Co. v. Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank, 190

S.E. 831, 854 (Ga. 1937).

Mistake is a misunderstanding of the

truth but without negligence.
carelessness.

Id.

Negligence results from

Matheson v. Pearson, 619 P.2d 321, 322 (Utah

1980).
The instant case is clearly an action for negligence.

Third

Party Plaintiffs base their action on the alleged "negligence and
failure of Third Party Defendant to survey and locate the subject
property."
Defendant

See Third Party Complaint, para. 7.
did

not

know

or understand

the truth

propriety of the alleged negligent survey.

Third Party
as to the

In short, there was

no mistake permitting application of Utah Code Annot. § 78-1226(3).

Third Party Plaintiffs are currently "statute shopping"

to avoid the application of the correct statute of limitations,
Utah Code Annot. § 78-12-25(2).
The

case

at

bar

is also

not

an

action

for

fraud

and

therefore fails to fall within the ambit of Utah Code Annot. §
78-12-26(3).

Even were fraud alleged, it would be inapplicable.

Negligence

is

distinguished

form

"fraud,

012 ,;

fraudulent

representations,
k i :i o w :i e d g e

or. fraudulent

and

i n t e n t i o n,

concealments,

which

In legal

necessary elements."

26(3) is inapplicable
for

a r e actually
>rts

Callan, 190 S.E, ai *-S4.

Irrjud or mi^taki- as applied

action

fraud

I heor P ! I ea J J y presen 1

constructive fraud aie

present, and

by the absence of

In Utah Code Annot. § 78-12-

to the current action.

negligence

is

Utah

Code

The applicable

Anno t,. & 7 8 - 1 2 - 2 5 ( 2 ) ,

Therefore, Third Pai ty PI ai nti ffs f cause of actioi i :I s bar reel b^
the statute of limitations.
CONCLUSION
Third
argument

Party

that

Plaintiffs'

the mistake

or fraud

"statute shoppi i lg."
applicable
fc

* > this

•'•»'>-

--^

leged.

action

•»'s for n e g l i g e n c e .
statute

ove, n
cause

;** action

applies

The

• simply

->

i lei ther

n< r r\as either

mistake

or

Trura Party Plaintiff may not simply allege

that the case at: bar falls within the fraud or mistake statute
limitations to withstand a motion for summary judgment.
h 1 III1 ,'il " I

Fitzgerald,

Hall v.

lll.ih III-1 i i l'w

,l,!d /!;"/ i ill Hi P U P

Rule 9(b) and 5 6 ( e ) .
rhi s cause of action in negligence arose over fourteen years
ago.

The statute of 1 imitations for negligence requires that the

action
I f if1

be brought wi thin four years.

«. 1 ci t u i f,j

requested

ill

that

I i in i I a f i tji: i s

Third

Party

This action is barred by

T h e i e f «re ,

Defendant's

i f"

is

Motion

Judgment be granted.
DATED thi s

$

day of Ji n le, ] 98' 7.
WALSTAD & BABCOCK

012;

r e s p ^ " * ' <J 1 I y

for

nummary

(fyejf fd'.UluJL
Robert F

Babcock

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and" correct copy of
/ —*7

1 h e f or € i qo I m\ "'.eooiid ""iif i| 11 en ^ '
June, 1987, postage prepaid

- * M i th:l s
*

M< i : to E.H

/

day of

Frankhauser,

Attorney for Third Part^. -Laintiffs, 660 South 200 East, Suite

017-7-cald2d.sup
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APPENDIX D

Appellant's Memorandum of Law
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E.H. Fankhauser(1032)
Attorney for Defendants and
Third Party Plaintiffs
660 South 200 East Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801)534-1143
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DUCHESNE, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT B. KLINGER and
KAROL J. KLINGER,
Plaintiffs,
THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFFS
MEMORANDUM OF LAW

vs.
EUGENE E KIGHTLY, HELEN
L. KIGHTLY, HARDY D. KREIS,
PEGGY R. KREIS BARNETT,
UNITED FARM AGENCY, INC.
r.r.a GERALD \V. WILKERSON.
Defendants.
EUGENE E. KIGHTLY, HELEN
L. KIGHTLY, HARDY D. KREIS,
PEGGY R. KREIS BARNETT,
Third Party Plaintiffs,
vs.
ULhiN H. CALDLR and JOHN Di
WILSON, individually and d/b/a
WILSON & CALDER,
Third Party Defendants.

Civil No. 86CV68D
Judge Davidson

FACTS
Third Party Plaintiffs. Kightly, Krcis and Earnett in July, 1971
purchased a parcel of real property from Strawberry Estates on a five (5)
year Uniform Real Estate Contract. The property is located in Duchesne
County and was purchased by description. Third Party Plaintiffs contracted
an hired die Third Party Defendant, Wilson & Calder, to survey die subject
property because of sor

,

;. rnm. ;ne ,;^r e\Miii: • •.ndaries.

Wilson & Calder, under signature of Glen H. Calder, prepared a Certificate
of Survey dated May 15. 1972, which Certificate stated the following:
"I, Glen H. Calder, do hereby certify that I
am a registered surveyor of the State of Utah, and
that the plat described hereon portrays a survey
made by me or under my direction. I further
certify that the above plat correctly shows the true
dimensions of the property surveyed and of the
improvements located thereon; and further that
there are no encroachments on said property."

A copy of this certificate is on file herein.
It has been established by Answers to Interrogatories that Glen H.
Calder, the person who signed the Certificate of Survey, did so without ever
seeing the subject property, without checking the survey notes and did not
place corner markers on the property. On or about July 23, 1983, Third
Party Plaintiffs sold the subject property to the Plaintiffs in this action,
Robert B. and Karol J. Klinger, by description as contained in the Certificate
of Survey signed by Calder. Some time in die early part of 1985, Klingers
discovered a defect in the survey as certified in that Calder had used the
wrong reference point in conducting the survey and thereby described the
property incorrectly as it had been described and sold to Klingers. Klingers

commenced the present action in May of 1986. well within (he three year
statute of limitations provided for in Utah Code A n. 78-12-26(3).
Subsection 3 tolls the statute of limitations on actions for mistake and
negligence until the time of discc.-. c. i said mistake or negligence. Once
again, the mistake was discovered by Klingers in the early pan of 1985.
Third Party Defendants were requested to eMablish the locations of the
boundaries of the subject property. This was there exclusive activity with
reference to this property. They did not perform and labor or services in the
design, planning, or supervision of any construction nor did they construct
any of the improvements on the real property prior to the performance of the
survey, at any time during the course of tfr -

. .

• \ • •. ing

the completion of the survey in May 1972.
ISSUE
!n an action for negligence is Utah Code Ann. 78-12-25 applicable for
c
~iirtr es of determining when the statute of limitations on the action has ran?
ARGUMENT
Utah Code Ann. 78-12-25 is inapplicable to the present case.
The statute in question provides:
(1) An action upon a contract, obligation or
liability not founded upon an instrument in writing;
also on an open account for goods, wares and
merchandise, and for any article charged in a store
account; also on an open account for work, labor or
services rendered, or materials furnished;
provided, that action in all of the foregoing cases
may be commenced at any time within four years
after the last charge is made or the last payment is
received

shall be commenced within four years.
The present case against Third Party Defendants involves an action in
tort, for negligence in the performance of the survey. It does not involve (1)
an action upon contract, obligation or liability not founded upon an
instrument of writing; (2) an open acco u : r r :i. * wares and
merchandise, and for any article charged in a store account; (3) or on an open
account f~r work, labor or services rendered, or materials furnished.
Simply because the code as annotated lists an number of real property actions
following the paragraph explaining the construction of the statute does not
force the conclusion that all real actions involving real property at some
point in the facts are suits in contract or for an open account. As previously
stated, the present is an action in tort for negligence and therefore Utah Code
Ann. 73-12-25 has no application.
ISSUE
Does Utah Code Ann. 78-12-25.5 apply to the case at bar?
ARGUMENT
POINT: Utah Code Ann. 78-12-25.5 defines the limitation of time for actions
for injury to persons or property.
The title of this section of the statute reads: "Injury due to defective
.design oi u< instruction <>l nnpi i>\timinls to lull jwoperty " Again, the
reference to real property contained in the language of the statute does not
force the adoption of this section as the appropriate limitation on the timely
filing of the present action. As pointed out in Third Party Plaintiffs

memorandum opposing Third Party Defendant's motion for summary
judgment, Third Party Defendants make no claim that the survey of the
property in question was connected in any way with the design, planning,
supervision of construction or construction of improvements to the real
property as expressly required by Utah Code Ann. 78-12-25.5.
ISSUE
Does Utah Code Ann. 78-12-26(3) provide the exclusive statue of limitations
i.pplk • x 1c to the case at bar?
ARGUMENT
POINT: The "discovery rule" is applicable to this case which involves the
mistake or negligence of Third Party Defendants.
Third Party Plaintiffs cause of action arose when the mistake was
ciscovered, in January or February of 1985. (51 Am. Jur. 2d 121,
limitations of Actions, §121). The duty of a surveyor or civil engineer to
one who employs them in the course of their profession is essentially the
same as that owed by any other person who holds himself out to others as
possessing skill and ability in some special employment and offers their
services to the public. They must exercise the same degree of care which a
surveyor or civil engineer or ordinary skill and prudence would exercise
under similar circumstances and may be held liable for damages sustained
due to their negligence and lack of skill. Utah Code Ann. 78-12-26(3)
provides in part:
An action for relief on the ground of... mistake;
but the cause of action in such case shall not be
deemed to have accrued until the discovery of the
facts constituting the . . . mistake (emphasis added)

In Mevers . McDonald. 635 P. 2d 84 (Utah, 1985) at S6. ncte 5, the Utah
Court states:
[T]he general rule is that a cause of action accrues
upon the happening of the last event necessary to
complete the cause of action.
The last event necessary to complete this cause of action was discovery of the
misiake in the survey made through Third Party Defendant's negligence.
The question of whether or not this section is applicable is one of fact. The
three-year limitation did not begin to run, nor could it have began to run
prior to that time.
The court must determine the sole question of whether or not Third
F-ny Plaintiffs knew of or should have known of the facts constituting the
nvs'ake within the three year time limitation prescribed by the statute. If
.'hire Party Defendants have objections to the timeliness of the present
action, they must plead such as an affirmative defense and thereafter they
bear the burden of proving that Third Party Plaintiffs knew of or should
have known of the facts constituting the mistake.
[The] time within which an action to obtain relief
against mistake or fraud must be commenced is
within the time fixed by statute, and the time begins
to run from the time that the aggrieved party
acquired, or sought to have acquired, knowledge of
the facts constituting the fraud or mistake.
(Weight v.Bailev, 147 P. 2d. 899 (Utah))

In De Vas v. Ncble. 369 P. 2d 290 (Utah) the Supreme Court held that
the statute of limitations was in the nature of an affirmative defense which

"must be expressly pleaded and proved." Furthermore, Third Party
Plaintiffs are under no obligation to plead or prove that Utah Code Ann. 7812-26(3) is either applicable or not applicable to the present case since that
burden rests upon Third Party Defendants. Third Party Plaintiffs are under
no obligation to make a general allegation that they " did not discover the
[mistake] until until a date within three years of the commencement of the
action." (Nunnelly v. First Federal Building & Loan Association of Ogden.
i 54 ?. 2d 620 (Utah) The entire burden of proving that the statute of
limitations has run rests upon Third Party Defendants. Thus far, they have
not proved that Third Party Plaintiffs knew of or should have known of the
facts constituting the mistake more than three years before this action was
commenced. Therefore, the trial should go forth since Third Party
Defendants have failed to meet the level of proof required by law. (Third
i-Lir'.y Defendants cannot prove such thai such knowledge existed three or
mere y-:ui's prior co the commencement of ibis action by simply pointing to
another szatute of limitations and asserting that it applies. They must prove
that Third Party Plaintiffs had notice of the facts constituting the mistake)
Fairness and equity require that the discovery rule be applied in the
instant action. Third Party Defendant's negligence has damaged Third Party
Plaintiffs. They must answer for those damages and cannot hide behind the
fact that Third Party Plaintiffs were unaware of Third Party Defendant's
negligence until some fourteen years later.

CONCLUSIONS
This case involves suit in torts for negligence. There is no assertion of
an open account, nor is there reliance upon contract doctrines for relief on
the part of Third Party Plaintiffs. Utah Code Ann. 78-12-25 is therefore

inapplicable. The case involves no claim of physical injury to persons or real
property. Utah Code Ann. 78-12-25.5 is therefore inapplicable. Tnird Party
Defendants have failed to prove that the statute of limitations has run by
proving that Third Party Plaintiffs had known or should have known of the
facts constituting the mistake for which they seek relief more than three years
prior to the commencement of the present action. Equity and fairness
require the application of Utah Code Ann. 78-12-26(3). Neither the court,
nor Third Party Plaintiffs need prove that a particular statute of limitations
applies for it is a up to the Third Party Defendants to prove that Third Party
Plaintiffs action could not be timely given Utah Code Ann. 78-12 et seq.
Third Party Plaintiffs have made every reasonable effort to bring the instant
case to bar in a timely manner and have complied fully with the provisions of
Utah Code Ann. 78-12-26(3).
TLhd Party Plaintiffs therefore pray that this court grant them the
i2\'c: sought in the complaint as well as any and ail other relief that the court
rhcuid Gc-em appropriate in this matter.
Dated this 19

of May, 1987.

Respectfully submitted,

Third Party Plaintiffs

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I certify that on this /"7 day of May, 1987,1 mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing to Robert F. Babcock, Attorney for Third
Party Defendants, 185 South State, Suite 1000, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111.

